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On the Determinants of Social Capital in Greece Compared to  
Countries of the European Union 
 
Summary 
Social capital refers to the stock of social relations, based on norms and networks of 
cooperation and trust that spill over to the market and state to enhance collective action 
between actors and achieve improved social efficiency and economic growth. The aim 
of the present paper is to discuss the implications of contemporary literature and 
empirical findings on social capital for the growth prospects of Greece, compared to the 
member-states of the European Union. In order to examine the potential of social capital 
to enhance growth, we must look into the factors that determine the nature and context 
of trust, norms and networks that have emerged in our multinational, multiethnic and 
multicultural Europe. 
The contribution of this paper is to offer insight on the determinants of social capital in 
Greece, compared to the European Union (EU - former 15 member-states). For this 
purpose, we regress an index of individual group membership, derived from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), on a set of individual as well as 
aggregate factors of social capital. Regression results provide evidence of the impact of 
both individual and institutional characteristics on group membership. Differences on 
the extent of group membership between countries might be indicative of the historical 
and cultural differences that have affected the evolution of social capital across Europe. 
Particularly in Greece, the relatively low level of group membership compared to the 
other EU countries might provide further evidence of its low levels of civicness. 
Historically, its weak civil society has been a result of a prior civic tradition of 
clientelism under arbitrary rule, the interference of special-interest groups and the lack 
of credibility and impartiality from the part of the state. And these factors might be 
responsible for the slow pace in reform and growth observed compared to the rest of the 
EU. Nevertheless, the findings on the determinants of social capital may direct us to 
possible means of rebuilding patterns of participatory and cooperative behavior, 
especially in countries with low levels of trust and civicness, such as Greece. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Much research has been dedicated to exploring the determinants of economic growth between 
countries and regions. The standard economic literature points to such factors as the relative 
stock of physical and human capital, the technological capacity of the economy, the capability 
to produce and diffuse knowledge and innovation, the management skills of leadership in 
business and state, as well as the degree of liberalization of domestic and international 
markets. Nevertheless, economic analysis has offered less attention to the context of social 
regulation in which development and reform is promoted. The present analysis examines the 
role of features of social organization, which include trust, norms and networks, and fall 
under the concept of social capital. 
 
Social capital contributes to economic growth by highlighting the importance of cooperation 
and trust within the firm, the market and the state. The interdependence between decisions of 
individual agents and the emergence of externalities and common goods makes cooperation 
imperative to maximizing social welfare. The superiority of social cooperation has long been 
documented in economic and social thought. But social capital, as social norms and networks, 
sustains cooperation by emphasizing its intrinsic value and its pursuit as an end in itself. It is a 
mixed-motive cooperation, in which individual behavior takes account of its effects on the 
welfare of others, alongside its own. In this manner, it operates as an internal commitment 
mechanism to resolving the social dilemma or collective action problems from free-riding and 
narrow-interested calculation. 
 
Empirical work on social capital, which covers a wide spectrum of social science disciplines, 
attribute differences between regions and countries in the level and rate of economic and 
social development to differences in the available stock of social capital. Regions or countries 
with relatively higher stocks of social capital, in terms of generalized trust and widespread 
civic engagement, seem to achieve higher levels of growth, compared to societies with low 
trust and low civicness (e.g. Brown and Ashman, 1996; Heller, 1996; Knack and Keefer, 
1997; Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Ostrom, 2000; Rose, 2000). According to these studies, 
social capital contributes to efficiency and growth by facilitating collaboration between 
individual conflicting interests towards the achievement of increased output and equitable 
distribution. 
 
Additionally, recent literature has focused on the determinants of social capital. This 
constitutes the first step towards developing a consistent and integrated framework 
concerning the nature of social capital and its relationship to socioeconomic performance. A 
number of studies have empirically tested the impact of individual- and aggregate-level 
factors on the components of social capital, that is, on social trust and group membership (e.g. 
Helliwell, 1996; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2000; 
Costa and Kahn, 2001; Rothstein and Stolle, 2001). Some of these tend to emphasize the role 
of individual factors in determining the incentive of individuals to invest in social capital, 
such as personal income and education, family and social status; others offer greater weight to 
the effect of more institutional or systemic factors, such as income inequality, confidence in 
government, impartiality of policy-making bodies, and prior patterns of cooperation and 
association amongst individuals in a group. 
 
The contribution of this paper is to offer insight on the determinants of social capital in 
Greece, compared to the European Union (EU). We begin our analysis by defining social 
capital in Section II. We adopt a rather multi-disciplinary approach and introduce views that 
originate from research in social science disciplines other than economics. In Section III, we 
briefly examine the implications of the literature on the potential of social capital in Greece to 
support reform and growth. Thus, we provide a short overview of references on the evolution 
of Greek civil society and the extent of social participation in policy-making for reform and 
development. We discover here that a prior civic tradition of clientelism under arbitrary rule,   4
the interference of special-interest groups and the lack of credibility and impartiality from the 
part of the state created distrust and uncertainty, at the expense of reform and growth. We 
continue in Section IV to examine the determinants of social capital in Greece and the EU. 
For this purpose, we regress and index of individual group membership, derived from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), on a set of individual as well as aggregate 
factors of social capital. Our empirical findings provide evidence on the impact of both 
individual and institutional characteristics on group membership. Furthermore, they direct us 
to possible means of rebuilding patterns of participatory and cooperative behavior, especially 
in countries with low levels of trust and civicness, such as Greece. We discuss the issue of 




II. Defining social capital 
 
In brief, social capital is a broad term encompassing the social norms and networks 
facilitating collective action for mutual benefit. But what type of norms and networks 
constitute social capital? What are their specific features and functions in resolving the 
collective action problem and producing mutual benefit? To answer these questions we shall 
present the main approaches adopted in the literature. Some of these views originate from 
research in social science disciplines other than economics. 
 
An approach that remains central to social capital research is expressed by the political 
scientist R. D. Putnam. In his seminal work, Making Democracy Work (1993), Putnam 
conducts a comparative study of Italian regions and attributes the divergence in institutional 
and economic performance between the North and the South to differences in their relative 
endowment of what he calls social capital. According to Putnam (1993), social capital 
includes “the features of social organization, such as trust, social norms and networks, that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action” (p. 167). Cooperation 
is often required between workers and managers, among political parties, between the 
government and private groups, between firms and voluntary organizations. Social norms and 
networks “provide defined rules and sanctions for individual participation in organizations” 
(p. 166), and promote reciprocity and cooperation “founded on a lively sense of mutual value 
to the participants of such cooperation, not a general ethic of the unity of all men or an 
organic view of society” (p. 168). On the whole, norms and networks provide for an internal 
mutual commitment mechanism such that “rational individuals will transcend collective 
dilemmas” (p. 167). 
 
However, it is important to distinguish the type of cooperation produced by social capital 
from that predicted by standard game theory. Putnam states, “game theory underestimates the 
ability of cooperative human behavior, and actually underpredicts voluntary cooperation” 
(1993, p. 166). Game theorists speak of cooperation attained in conditions of perfect 
information, third party enforcement, tit-for-tat strategies, indefinitely repeated games (Folk 
Theorem), and face-to-face interaction amongst a limited number of players. But “success in 
overcoming social dilemmas of collective action”, Putnam contends, “depends on the broader 
social context in which the game is played. ... Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community 
that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and 
networks of civic engagement” (p. 166). He speaks of a type of cooperation that “articulates 
the use of pre-existing social connections between individuals to help circumvent problems of 
imperfect information and enforceability” (p. 169). 
 
Pre-existing social connections between individuals range from kinship ties to networks of 
civic engagement that encompass broader segments of society and support collaboration at 
community an regional level, such as professional groups, sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual 
aid groups, rotating credit associations, cultural associations and voluntary unions. The   5
essence of social norms and networks is that they are built up for reasons other than their 
economic value to participants. Putnam’s claim was that membership in associations 
strengthens political and economic efficiency even though the associations themselves play 
no role in either the polity or the economy. As the economist K. Arrow describes the concept: 
“Much of the reward for social interactions is intrinsic, i.e. the interaction is the reward, or at 
least the motives for interaction are not economic. People may get jobs through networks of 
friendship or acquaintance, but they do not, in many cases join the networks for that purpose 
... This is not to deny that networks and other social inks may also form for economic reasons. 
One line of reasoning is that the social networks guard against market failure that is caused by 
asymmetric information; they are supplementary activities that exploit monitoring devices not 
other wise available” (2000, p. 3). 
 
In this light, Putnam uses indices of civil society and political participation to measure the 
stock of social capital. These are indices of participatory behavior and express the extent to 
which individuals fulfill obligations as citizens (voter turn-out referenda) and members of 
social groups (number of professional, cultural and leisure associations). Most of the 
empirical literature on social capital continues to use indices of civicness and group 
membership, along with indices of generalized interpersonal trust, to measure social capital. 
 
But not all types of social connections and organizations have a positive effect on social 
efficiency and economic performance. As J. Coleman, from the sociological perspective, puts 
it, although “a group within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is 
able to accomplish much more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness and 
trust” (1988, p. S101), “a given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain 
actions may be useless or harmful to others” (p. S98). M. Olson (1971), from the economics 
perspective, sets it bluntly when he refers to the activity of special-interest groups. Special-
interest organizations for collective action represent a narrow segment of an economy’s 
income-earning capacity and yet manage to redistribute more of society’s income to 
themselves through lobbying and monopolistic competition. These distributional coalitions, as 
Olson calls them, make the economy less productive and socially efficient. 
 
Putnam recognizes this, and makes an attempt to separate groups with positive and negative 
social effects by distinguishing between vertical and horizontal networks. Vertical networks, 
highly characteristic of hierarchical, paternalistic and clientelistic social relations, are based 
on cooperation achieved by coercive action and force, exercised by the privileged to exploit 
the rest of the population. Examples referred to in his case study are nepotism (or what has 
been termed ‘amoral familism’), the Mafia or the institutional Catholic Church prevalent in 
the South of Italy. On the other hand, horizontal networks in the form of multiple professional 
and leisure associations, such as those dominant in the North of Italy or in the business 
networks of the Mezzogiorno, are assumed to be positively associated to good government 
and improved economic performance, as “they bring collaboration in broader communities by 
respecting individuality and defining social obligations” (Putnam, 1993, p. 175). 
 
Another question that arises is how norms and networks evolve. The point to note from 
Putnam’s work is the public good nature of norms and networks, which “increase with use 
and diminish with disuse” (1993, p. 170). Social relationships die out if not maintained and 
norms depend on regular communication and interaction between individuals and groups. 
Trust between individuals, also mentioned as a component of social capital in numerous 
studies, “lubricates cooperation. The greater the level of trust within a community the greater 
the likelihood of cooperation. And cooperation itself breeds trust” (p. 171). Thus, the creation 
and destruction of social capital is marked by virtuous and vicious cycles. However, such a 
view does not suffice to explain the emergence or destruction of norms and networks; it 
ignores the role of factors other than a feedback or path dependency process that affect social 
capital accumulation. Critics such as the political scientist M. Levi (1996) point to the role of 
governments: trust in government is key to generating generalized interpersonal trust and   6
minimizing the adverse effects of narrow-interested organizations. This is achieved through 
rules and institutions that ensure transparency, fairness and credibility for government actors. 
Rothstein and Stolle (2001), political scientists as well, offer empirical evidence in favor of 
the positive and statistically significant impact of the institutional impartiality of government 
officials on generalized trust. 
 
Others, for instance the economist E. Glaeser, stress the role of individual characteristics, such 
as income and education, in determining the stock of social capital in which individuals invest 
in to obtain influence, social status and access to networks. The empirical literature confirms 
the impact of individual characteristics on group membership (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000; Costa 
and Kahn, 2001). For instance, higher levels of income and education coincide with a strong 
probability for group membership and interpersonal trust from the part of the individual. This 
may lead to the idea that not all individuals may enjoy access to the stock of social capital 
available in a society, on account of low income or other characteristics that lead to social 
exclusion and hinder their incentive to cooperate. One of the most important factors viewed in 
this light is income distribution and poverty; relatively high income inequality and high 
poverty rates, appear to weaken individual incentives to cooperate and act collectively 
(Knack, 1999). Our view is that such circumstances have a negative impact on social capital, 
not only because of absolute poverty, with its adverse effects on the physical ability of 
individuals to respond to their role as social actors in groups; also because of relative poverty, 
which creates sentiments of discrimination and injustice, thus leading to distrust towards 
people, collective action and society as a whole. 
 
Apparently, distrust towards government and social groups, especially in authoritarian 
regimes and sectarian societies, may hinder incentives for collective action and the 
development of social capital. However, according to J. Fox (1996), a political scientist, the 
growth of the building-block organizations of an autonomous civil society in an authoritarian 
and sectarian environment requires the synergy of state and society or what he terms the 
political construction of social capital. As the author argues, to rely on the state or society 
alone, according to most state- or society-oriented approaches to collective action and civil 
society-building, does not explain the origins of institutions and thus cannot resolve the 
reconstruction of social capital, especially in societies with low levels of trust and civicness. 
Society-oriented approaches tend to adopt an ‘historical determinist’ explanation to social 
capital formation or stress social structure, which take political strategies, ideologies, values 
and cultures as givens; state-oriented approaches emphasize the centrality of rules and 
incentives that induce societal responses, treating the social arena as a residual ‘black box’ 
(1996, p. 1090). His long-term regional case studies in rural Mexico show that the 
development of social capital can be co-produced by the state and local societal actors, such 
as grassroots and regional organizations. On the one hand, state reformists create political 
opportunities, following pressure from local groups for securing political, civil and social 
rights. On the other hand, local groups produce social energy, shared values and common 
goals, following support from external groups (international development or religious and 
human rights groups) and inspired leaders, who are willing to pay the ‘irrational’ start-up 
costs of mobilization. 
 
A notable point to be made concerns the ability of state-society synergy to promote social 
capital accumulation and equitable growth even in an environment of extreme social 
divergence and conflict. B. Fine (2001), an economist and critic of the concept of social 
capital, states that it cannot be addressed outside of a context of conflict and power relations. 
But he becomes skeptical of whether social capital, as it appears in the literature in terms of 
widespread trust and civic engagement, could overcome conditions of conflict and power and 
resist the pervasive forces of parochial groups. A response to this sort of skepticism may 
come from P. Heller (1996), a sociologist, who observes that the synergy between state and 
society creates the institutional forms and political processes required for negotiating the 
group compromises through which redistribution and growth can be reconciled. By exploring   7
the civics movement and local government restructuring in Kerala, India, he arrives to the 
conclusion that “[its] high level of social development and successful redistributive reforms 
[beyond those achieved in any other Indian state] are a direct result of mutually reinforcing 
interactions between a programmatic labor movement and a democratic state” (1996, p. 
1055). Of course, Heller recognizes that in the region “not all collective action is conducive to 
developmentally useful forms of state intervention” (p. 1057). He points to the politics of cast 
and communal groups, which do not readily lend themselves to positive-sum 
accommodations, geared as they are to securing particularistic interests and giving rise to 
patronage politics. But what makes this region exceptional is that “the cacophony of 
fragmented societal demands has taken a back seat to demands of a more programmatic and 
encompassing character ... conducive to the tranformative projects broadly associated with 
development, particularly those of redistributive character” (p. 1057). 
 
On the whole, the state and society managed to overcome the adverse effects of social 
fragmentation and promote a more encompassing and universalistic development and 
redistribution program. There may exist a multiplicity of motives, conditions and social 
outcomes in the activity of groups. Norms and networks may reflect different perceptions of 
individual groups on issues of development and redistribution, efficiency and fairness. Some 
of these perceptions represent the narrow interest of smaller groups, at the expense of the 
common good and social aims. Still it may depend on a set of generalized norms and 
networks of collaboration and synergy between segments of the rest of society to confront, 
isolate and overthrow practices exercised by special-interest groups. Ultimately, the 
expansion of social capital depends on the willingness and ability of individuals to pursue 
collaboration that substitutes group-specific and narrow-interested norms and networks with 
generalized norms and institutions of shared values (Levi, 1996; Anderson, 2000). In other 
words, the common goal of growth and equity in any economy may be better served through 
collective action which aims at preserving generalized social norms and networks of justice 
and equality. We speak of a kind of collective action that does not merely provide the social 
means for individuals to secure personal economic gain, but serves as an end in itself, 




III. Social capital in Greece: An overview of the relevant literature 
 
With regards to the stock of social capital in Greece, almost no data is available on the 
standard trust and civic engagement indicators used throughout the literature.
1 At the national 
level, only the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which consists of a sample of 
households and individuals for each of the EU member-states, includes a question that proxies 
civic engagement indicators. In the section on social relations, the ECHP questionnaire 
includes a question which asks individual respondents to declare whether or not they are a 
member of any club or organization, such as a sport or entertainment club, a local 
neighborhood group, a party, etc. 
 
In TABLE 1 of the Appendix, we depict the proportion of the respondents in each country 
that claim to be a member of a group. Data has been derived from Wave 6 (1999) of the 
ECHP. Evidently, levels of group membership vary widely between countries in the EU-15, 
ranging from 65.1% in Denmark, to a low of 8.9% in Greece. Thus, Greece has the lowest 
level of group membership compared to other EU member-states. This is in line with the 
argument developed in studies we turn to later on in this section, that Greek civil society is 
                                                           
1 One of the most traditional datasets used in the empirical social capital literature, the World Values Survey, 
includes data for nearly 90 countries around the globe, but not Greece. Moreover, the European Social Survey, as 
an analogous to the General Social Survey conducted in the US and used widely in the analysis of social capital, 
was launched in the late 1990’s for a set of major European countries, in which Greece has only recently 
participated.   8
weak and implies a low stock of social capital and trust. It is also evident from TABLE 1 that 
countries with lower levels of group membership tend to coincide with countries with lower 
levels of per capita GDP. 
 
Following these results, we might roughly say that there is an association between social 
capital, in the form of group membership, and socioeconomic performance. Of course, further 
research is necessary to determine the causal link between group membership and 
socioeconomic indicators. For instance, aggregate levels of group membership may 
independently affect economic growth rates between countries and regions. However, at the 
individual level, per capita GDP, as an index of social welfare in the region of residence of an 
individual, may determine his/her incentive for group membership. Barro (1998), in his work 
on the determinants of economic growth, offers empirical support to the Lipset hypothesis, 
according to which increases in the in the various measures of the standard of living would 
generate a gradual increase in civic engagement and democratic institutions. Putnam (1993), 
on the other hand, argues that it is civicness that determines socioeconomic growth. His 
regression results reveal the stronger explanatory power of the 19
th century civic society 
measures in determining contemporary civicness and socioeconomic development between 
Italian regions.
2 Whatever the case, at this point we may only assert that there exists an 
interrelationship between social capital and socioeconomic performance. Regions with higher 
stocks of social capital are often the regions with higher levels of economic and social 
development. 
 
If our assumption of the positive relationship between social capital and GDP holds true, then 
the low stock of social capital in Greece may explain conditions of slow reform and economic 
backwardness. The development of social capital in Greece has been hampered by two 
factors. The first refers to the economic and political instability, which characterizes most of 
the country’s modern history, and is marked by foreign conquest and intervention, waves of 
refugees and immigrants, and periods of civil war and dictatorship. The second involves the 
development of civil society in the economy and polity. It was affected by norms and 
networks based on patron-client relations, nepotism and corruption which were unable to play 
a constructive role in promoting economic development and social reform in the country. 
 
Our reference to Greece’s modern history for an evaluation of social capital draws from the 
significance of traditional civic norms and networks and the sustained impact of events of 
authoritarian rule, social divisions and political conflict on social capital. Our historical 
account begins with events as distant as the Ottoman Empire, which was present for four 
centuries until the mid-1800s in most of the eastern and central part of Greece, while the 
islands of the Ionian and Aegean Sea remained under Venetian rule, which interchanged with 
periods of French, British and Russian rule until the turn of the 20
th century. The 1900s began 
with the Balkan Wars and the War in Asia-Minor, which brought an influx of refugees and 
the exchange of populations. Until the middle of the century, Greece also faced two World 
Wars, the Italian-German occupation, and a civil war, which induced the intervention of 
British troops. Even at times of peace, the country endured the arbitrary governance of 
monarchs and dictators, under the auspices of the foreign Great Powers, until the 
establishment of the Colonels’ dictatorship, which fell in 1974. In an environment of 
economic and political instability, conditions for the development of civil society could only 
worsen at the advent of international economic shocks, from the Great Depression in 1929, to 
the oil-crises of the 1970s and the effects of regional integration and market globalization 
towards the end of the century. 
                                                           
2 That the quality of public life and the performance of social institutions are powerfully influenced by civic norms 
and networks is not a new concept. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 19
th century, it 
was the American’s propensity for civic association that most impressed him as key to their unprecedented ability 
to make democracy work (Putnam, 1995). In an assessment of the economic performance of contemporary US, 
Lodge (1997) asserts that it was 19
th century communitarianism that promoted a policy towards building the public 
infrastructure necessary for economic development and popular welfare.   9
 
Under these circumstances, Greek civic society was severely weakened, and this allowed for 
the emergence of social norms and networks, based on informal kinship ties or corrupt and 
narrow-interested social groups. According to Lyberaki and Tsakalotos (2000): “... One of the 
results, which we would argue has been particularly important for the economy, is a particular 
expression of short-termism. Arbitrary and changing rules of the state, the clientelistic ties 
that are ‘here today and gone tomorrow’ put a premium on extracting the maximum gain from 
any situation as quickly as possible and make cooperation with others in horizontal 
relationships very risky” (p. 10). This partly explains why the Greek economy has been more 
successful, since at least later Ottoman times, in such areas as commerce, banking, shipping 
and tourism, and the continuing prevalence of very small-scale family-based firms. These 
economic activities could be nurtured within smaller groups of family and kin, which in a 
low-trust society offer defense against uncertainty and opportunistic behavior. But these 
activities and small-scale family establishments were extremely vulnerable to regional and 
global competition after EEC accession and the liberalization of domestic markets. Thus, they 
extended to patron-client relations in dealings with the state to gain preferential protection and 
privileged access to public services, which further inhibited reform and growth. 
 
This brings us to our second factor behind the backwardness of civil society, which identifies 
with the persistence of clientelistic and paternalistic relations in both the private and public 
sector in Greece. Despite the restitution of democracy in 1974 and the steps taken towards 
social, political and economic reform, through the expansion of constitutional rights and legal 
protection, and the promotion of medium- and long-term economic programs, the 
development of civil society has been a very slow process. In the post-1974 era, according to 
Mouzelis and Pagoulatos (2002), new systemic / institutional imbalances were created that 
undermined what strength civil society was gaining. The authors observe that partitocratic and 
ploutocratic elements were intensified as political parties and economically powerful 
individuals continued to compete for the control of organized groups, trade-unions and non-
governmental organizations. Partitocracy, in the form of favoritism (rousfeti), and plutocracy, 
in the form of intermeshed interests (diaplekoma sumferonta), permeated Greek civil society, 
and this had adverse effects on economic reform and growth.  
 
To explore this argument Lyberaki and Tsakalotos (2000) present a case study of two reform 
initiatives in Greece: the first was promoted by the Greek socialist party, PASOK in the 
1980s, the second by the conservative New Democracy in the early 1990s, Despite 
differences, both initiatives shared the common goal of combating the inefficiency of public 
bureaucracy, the prevalence of state intervention and the mediation through clientelistic 
relations. However, mechanisms of economic planning and policy proved more difficult to 
implement, because the Greek social formation was particularly underdeveloped in social 
capital. As Lyberaki and Tsakalotos note, PASOK’s policies were crucially undermined by 
the role of clientelistic practices in the appointment of personnel and in the use of the new 
institutions to consolidate its social and electoral base, thus reproducing the favoritist 
practices of the existing public administration. On the other hand, the New Democracy’s 
privatization reform strategy was hardly any more effective, as it failed to gain support, not 
only from the public sector employees (segments of which might be considered extensions of 
the prior ‘protectionist’ regime), but also from the Federation of Greek industries, which 
although could have been regarded as a natural ally to pro-market reform, it never became a 
major pro-privatization lobby. Powerful economic interests against reform included public 
sector suppliers and smaller private companies that feared competition. 
 
Within such a context, state officials and sectional interest groups create such distortion and 
uncertainty with regards to the allocation of the costs and benefits of a certain reform policy, 
that a majority can oppose it even if it will benefit all. In other words, reform initiatives 
suffered from the absence of state-society synergy relations described in our previous section. 
State-society synergy relations are crucial to the effective management of reform policy   10
because they secure the collaboration of stakeholders in determining common developmental 
goals. In Greece, implementation was impaired because social partners who had something to 
gain or lose from a particular set of measures had not been part of the decision-making 
process. This is further confirmed by a case study conducted by Papoulias and Tsoukas 
(1998), who assess a set of development reform policies promoted during the post-dictatorial 
period from 1974 to 1992. One of their criteria involves the participation of social 
stakeholders in the process of planning and implementing specific reform policies considered 
of wider social significance, i.e. with an economic and social impact on a wider segment of 
the population. The authors discover only that out of 41 reform programs, only 17 take 
account of the views and reactions of social stakeholders. Of these 17 programs, only 4 were 
of greater and moderate importance. These findings point to the difficulty of the state to 
collaborate with wider social groups to plan and implement socially oriented reform projects. 
 
But even in the face of regional and global market integration, which appeared to reduce state 
intervention, the synergy between social partners to build social capital at a local level was 
crucial to economic reform and growth. Paraskevopoulos (2001) explores this argument by 
explicitly measuring the stock of social capital in Greece - between the North and South 
Aegean - and comparing levels of socioeconomic reform and development at the regional 
level. Based on results of social network analyses, the author observes that both the 
Dodecanese and the Cyclades prefectures in the Southern Aegean demonstrate a general 
exchange network between local social actors that is dense and horizontally structured, 
providing alternative leadership roles and public-private synergies. On the contrary, the 
prefectures of the Northern Aegean islands (Lesbos, Chios and Samos) are characterized by a 
weaker local institutional structure due to the less dense a highly centralized relations around 
the Regional Secretariat, that is around the local administrative body of the state. The loose 
connections between public and private actors and the central role of the state within the 
general exchange network in this region indicate the operation of vertical structures and thus 
the low level of collective action for regional development. The weaker institutional capacity 
of the Northern Aegean compared to the South is also confirmed by qualitative analysis that 
points to the relatively lower level of voluntary participation in organizations, which also 
draws from the weak civic traditions inherited from Ottoman times. The author uses this 
information to explain the divergences observed between the North and South Aegean, and 
the relative ineffectiveness of local actors in the North to exploit the European Structural 
Funds and promote development. 
 
The overall conclusion drawn from our analysis is that one of the reasons why post-1974 
reform and development were very slow in Greece was the low stock of social capital. A prior 
civic tradition of clientelism under arbitrary rule, the interference of special-interest groups 
and the lack of credibility and impartiality from the part of contemporary political institutions 
impaired the strength of Greek civil society. These were factors that excluded the civil society 
from the national reform process, and inspired its members with a sense of suspicion and 
distrust, which permeated all aspects of economic, social and political interaction (Schmitter, 
1995). Nevertheless, more research needs to be undertaken to measure the individual and 
aggregate determinants of social capital in Greece and the impact of dominant norms and 
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Our present task is to determine the set of individual and aggregate factors that influence 
social capital in Greece, compared to the EU. For this purpose, we conduct a series of 
regression analyses over a sample of individuals from Greece and the EU (the former 15 
member-states, except Luxembourg). The dependent variable representing social capital is 
measured by the group membership index derived from the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP). The variable is dichotomous and takes a value of 1 when the individual 
declares that he/she is a member of a group, and a value of 0 when he/she is not. Questions on 
group membership, along with questions on the number of associations per individual or per 
locality / region, express participatory behavior as proxies to social capital (Spellerberg, 
2001). 
 
There is skepticism in the literature of whether group membership, as an indicator of 
participatory behavior, is an appropriate measure of social capital. These measures were 
initially used in the social capital literature to empirically examine the nature and impact of 
social capital in the society and economy (Putnam 1993; Helliwell, 1996). However, other 
empirical attempts examining the impact of group membership and association on economic 
aggregates, do not confirm statistically significant results (Knack and Keefer, 1997). The 
argument is that group membership cannot be used as an indicator of social capital, because it 
encompasses interactions between individuals and social groups that function under different 
and conflicting motives, conditions and social outcomes. Social capital thus defined becomes 
a vacuum, and includes members of all types of organized groups and associations, from 
charity foundations, labor and employers’ unions, and football teams and choirs, to small 
special-interest groups that might promote social discrimination, nepotism and corruption. In 
practice, group membership may overestimate the stock of social capital as it captures passive 
forms of group membership along with participation in groups with less socially benign goals. 
For instance, individuals may become members of groups such as trade unions and 
professional associations, as a mandatory requirement to secure employment and insurance, 
without actively taking part in union meetings or even paying membership fees. But even 
when participation is more active and directed to achieving certain goals, it may be at the 
expense of the wider social benefit, as is the case with special-interest groups. 
 
In this light, more recent studies on social capital have turned to attitudinal survey data, based 
on individual respondents’ opinion on trust, cooperation and collective action, and network 
analyses, based on the types of horizontal or vertical associations developed amongst 
individuals and groups. However, there are no standard measures of the core components of 
social capital, namely norms and networks, due to the ambiguity involved in choosing which 
norms and networks relative to others could be termed social capital. For instance, should 
activities of special-interest groups, as a form of collective action which operates on certain 
common norms and goals amongst their members, be included when measuring the stock of 
social capital of a locality, even though they function at the expense of the wider social 
interest? Either way, how do we distinguish whether a particular group or organization 
functions as a ‘special-interest group’? Unable to precisely determine the motives for 
collective action behind the norms and networks of social groups, the researcher tends to rely 
on observing the positive and negative social effects of a certain group. A standard approach 
in the social capital literature had been to distinguish between ‘Putnamian’ groups - those 
with a horizontal network structure and cooperative spirit, which have a positive social impact 
- and ‘Olsonian’ groups - those with a more or less vertical organizational structure serving 
special interests at the expense of the common good. But this approach may be misleading in 
determining the ‘social’ incentives of a group. Knack and Keefer (1997), who employ this 
distinction to explain annual growth in a cross-country study, do not produce statistically 
significant results for either group. One could perhaps speculate that the reason for this 
finding is that social groups are not purely either ‘Putnamian’ or ‘Olsonian’: groups might 
operate on a set of mixed motives, which are more or less socially oriented for different 
segments of one group or class of groups at different point in time. 
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Furthermore, although groups representing and producing perceptions, attitudes and outcomes 
at the expense of the common good may exist, they may very well trigger the collaboration 
and synergy between segments of the rest of society to promote generalized norms and 
networks of reciprocity, equity and fairness and isolate practices exercised by special-interest 
groups. In the words of sociologist L. Paterson (2001): “If we ask ... how and when social 
capital is created, perhaps the answer lies in moments of sharp social conflict, where power 
relations are shifting, and where the outcome is not determined in advance because there is a 
myriad of possible new networks to be formed. Each segment of civil society is forced to 
chooses allies ... and thereby to create new bonds of social capital” (p. 54). Thus, group 
membership may still be regarded as a measure of social capital when viewed as an indicator 
of social identity and debate as prerequisites towards establishing generalized norms and 
networks across different groups. The multiplicity and indeterminacy of perceptions are there 
not to complicate, but merely to confirm the dynamic nature of society in seeking its sense 
and means for improvement. 
 
In order to assess the determinants of group membership as our proxy to social capital, we 
regress the membership variable upon a set of independent variables across the EU members-
states. Because of the dichotomous nature of the group membership variable, we estimate the 
following logistic regression model: 
 
 
Pi (yi = 1 | xi) = e 
xi β / (1 + e 
xi β ) => Li = ln Pi / 1-Pi = xi β 
 
 
Thus, we predict the probability of an individual being a member of a group, conditional on 
the set of independent variables, Pi (yi = 1 | xi).
3 The independent variables to be included in 
the present analysis refer to characteristics of the individual, as well as aggregate features of 
the locality - region or country - in which the individual resides, in order to capture 
institutional or systemic determinants of group membership. The set of individual factors 
include personal income education, working status, age gender, and marital status, in 
accordance to the relevant literature on the determinants of social capital. The set of aggregate 
factors include regional or country dummies, or certain socioeconomic variables, as per capita 
GDP, unemployment and income inequality. Details on the description of variables and 





B. Regression results 
 
We turn to our regression results, presented in TABLE 4a, b and c of the Appendix. TABLE 
4a records results for Greece and the EU, in which the set of aggregate independent variables 
are given by regional dummy variables. TABLE 4b includes results for the EU where the 
aggregate impact on group membership is captured by dummy variables at the country level. 
TABLE 4c repeats estimation for the same individual independent variables for Greece and 
the EU, but replaces aggregate regional / country dummy variables with socioeconomic 
indicators that appear in the literature to be associated with social capital. These indicators 
have been calculated at regional level for Greece and at country level for the EU member-
states. 
 
                                                           
3 To simplify estimation procedures, a logit transformation of the logistic regression model is applied. That is, the 
dependent variable is expressed as the natural log of the odds ratio (Li = ln Pi / 1-Pi), which is a linear function of 
the regression coefficients β.   13
The first point worth noting from the total of our regression results is that amongst all 
variables included in the analysis, education, and particularly the acquisition of a tertiary 
education degree, has one of the highest coefficients and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level for all equations estimated in the present analysis. In Greece, obtaining a tertiary level 
degree increases the odds in favor of being a group member by 4.3 compared to having less 
than secondary level education degree, and by 1.8 compared to a secondary level degree. In 
the EU, the impact is more moderate, since obtaining a tertiary education degree compared to 
having less than secondary level education increases the odds of being a group member by 
around 2.5. The significance of education in enhancing individual incentives to group 
membership and contributing to the expansion of social capital has been confirmed in the 
literature by empirical work based on regression analyses, such as that of Helliwell (1996), 
Brehm and Rahn (1997), Glaeser et al. (2000), Costa and Kahn (2001), and Rothstein and 
Stolle (2001). Overall, education is viewed as the factor developing opportunities for 
collective action, either through offering access to social networks and personal 
acquaintances, or through cultivating values and morals leading to a sense of citizenship and 
solidarity. In some cases, education is interpreted as a means for attaining social status, which 
is complementary to human capital in generating higher income. This interpretation pertains a 
more individualistic and instrumental approach to group membership. Also education is seen 
as a means for moral development and social awareness, which in a society of widespread 
cooperation produces benefits in the form of higher income as a medium-run by-product, 
rather than as an end in itself. It is this latter outcome that is closer to the view of social 
capital adopted in the present paper. But at this point it is extremely difficult to separate the 
two outcomes and assess their impact on group membership independently. 
 
Following education, age is another variable that appears in most empirical work on social 
capital. The studies mentioned above provide evidence of the significance of age as a 
determinant of social capital. Particularly, Glaeser et al. (2000), who examine a sample of 
individuals from the US, predict and inverted U-shaped profile of social capital over the 
lifecycle, so that group membership is higher when a person is in his/her 30s or 40s, i.e. 
during the working period of one’s lifecycle. Similar conclusions may be drawn for our Greek 
sample: coefficients are highest for the group from 36 to 45 years and are equivalent to an 
increase in the odds of being a member by 4.2 compared to the eldest group used as a 
baseline, and an increase in the odds by 1.6 when compared to the youngest age group. 
However, results produced by the EU sample do not offer support to the lifecycle hypothesis 
in social capital accumulation at the individual level. One observes higher coefficients for the 
age group from 56 to 65, i.e. the age group around retirement, followed by the youngest age 
group of 16 to 25, who are still at school or investing in human capital. Moreover, the 
coefficient for the age group from 26 to 35, in which individuals enter the labor market and/or 
further their training and education, has the smallest coefficient amongst all variables and is 
statistically significant in most cases. Also in the EU regressions the coefficients are much 
smaller for all age groups so that the increase in the odds of being a member from the baseline 
does not exceed a figure of 1.5 for any age group. This provides evidence that patterns of 
behavior vary from country to country, so that within the EU as a whole, the impact of age 
and lifecycle hypotheses are much less of an issue in determining the probability of an 
individual to be a member of a group. A possible explanation for behavioral patterns observed 
in the EU compared to Greece is that youth and retirees are encouraged to take part in social 
groups or organizations, as established norms regard them as active and productive members 
of society. 
 
Another variable belonging to the spectrum of individual factors tested in the empirical 
literature is income. The relationship between income (here personal, net of taxes) and group 
membership is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, it may be argued 
that the more affluent will have a higher probability to participate: individuals with higher 
levels of income are more likely to purchase group membership as leisure or a luxury 
consumption good. This is partly contradictory to our assumption that social capital is mainly   14
a resource for the well-being of either the individual or the group or society as a whole. 
However, there might be evidence that group membership is unlike leisure. If group 
membership were equivalent to leisure, as defined in standard labor supply theory, then it 
would have fallen with the increase of employment (or paid work). But our regressions offer 
weak evidence of an inverse relationship between membership and employment. Specifically, 
the employment variable which corresponds to a dummy variable equal to one when the 
individual works more than 15 hours a week, and to zero when the individual declares either 
unemployed or inactive, has a coefficient that is statistically insignificant, although it has the 
expected negative sign in Greece, whereas in the EU it is positive but of negligible 
magnitude. Thus, as Glaeser et al. (2000) point out, membership in groups is not driven 
exclusively by the opportunity cost of time. A number of empirical studies based on time 
allocation analyses outside of the social capital realm observe that volunteers with high 
opportunity costs of time - either in terms of actual earned wages or the self-perceived 
(monetary) value of services provided by volunteer activities - make a higher contribution to 
charities than volunteers with low opportunity costs of time (Justor and Stafford, 1991; 
Freeman, 1997). These studies point to the importance of social benefits (meeting new 
people) and moral benefits (helping someone or society in general) in individuals’ decisions 
to undertake volunteer or unpaid work. Freeman (1997) states that people appear to respond 
to requests to volunteer because they value charitable activity, and introduces the concept of a 
‘conscience good’ to account for the tendency of people to volunteer when requested to do so. 
This is also quite far from an interpretation of such activities as merely a consumption of 
luxury goods in the form of social status and publicity. 
 
Unlike employment, unemployment seems to be more important in determining the 
individual’s incentive to be a member of a group. Being unemployed creates a stronger 
disincentive for group membership. Although the magnitude and sign of coefficients appear 
to be similar between Greece and the EU, their statistical significance varies, as they are 
statistically significant at the 1% level only in the EU regressions. In any case, moving from 
the situation of being inactive to that of being unemployed reduces the odds of being a 
member of a group by around 0.6. It might be argued that the unemployed lack income to 
afford group membership or they spend their plentiful leisure job-seeking and securing a 
source of minimum income, rather than participating in groups. Additional factors affecting 
the individual’s incentive to participate when facing unemployment might lie in sentiments of 
distrust he/she develops towards other social groups and society as a whole, which are 
considered to have deprived him/her of opportunities for employment and self-development. 
Brehm and Rahn (1997) confirm the negative impact of being unemployed on individual’s 
sentiments of interpersonal trust. Aggregate unemployment variables in our sample appear to 
offer a similar picture, as the coefficients are negative and statistically significant for both 
Greece and the EU. 
 
Finally, gender and marital status are also determinants of social capital. Being male as 
opposed to being female appears to increase the probability of group membership. 
Coefficients for Greece and the EU are statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifically, 
being male increases the odds in favor of being member of a group by a bit over 30% in 
Greece and over 50% in the EU. It is perhaps the case that our results are not capturing the 
social capital produced within the home and family, or even within family businesses, quite 
often in the hands of female co-heads of the household, since our group membership variable 
includes forms of social capital outside the home. Furthermore, even if women participate in 
the labor force, and are thus exposed to a series of at least work-related social organizations, 
group membership may not increase, as a result of carrying most household and family 
obligations. Cost and Kahn (2001) observe that in the US, where labor participation and 
group membership of women in formal organizations has increased during recent decades, 
social capital produced within the home, in the form of visiting friends and entertaining at 
home, has fallen amongst women. Evidence of differences between men and women with 
regards to group membership might also be provided here from our variable of marriage.   15
Marriage, of males and females regardless, appears to have no effect in Greece, contrary to 
results obtained in the EU, where the impact on the probability of the individual being a 
member of a group is positive and statistically significant. By restricting the sample to men 
and then to women in the EU, the marriage coefficient is positive and twice as high for men 
(0.185) than women (0.096) and remains statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, family 
obligations do not hamper incentives for group membership, but evidently there is a 
discrepancy between men and women. 
 
However, it appears from our results that it is not only the set of individual variables that 
affects the probability for group membership in our sample. Regression results support he 
argument that characteristics of the region or country in which the individual resides have a 
significant impact on his/her incentive to participate in social groups. In TABLE 4a, regional 
dummies in Greece and country dummies within the EU are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In Greece, individuals are more likely to be members of groups if they live in any other 
region outside that of Attiki, i.e. outside of the capital Athens and its wider suburban area. 
Being a resident of Central Greece, which includes the prefectures of Ipiros, the Peloponese, 
the Ionian Islands and Sterea Ellada, creates a stronger incentive to be a member of a group: 
the odds increase by 2.2 compared to being a resident of Attiki, which is used as the baseline 
region. Then follows the North of Greece, which includes the prefectures of Thraki, 
Macedonia and Thessaly, and not further behind, the South of Greece that encompasses the 
Aegean Islands and Crete. Being a resident of these regions corresponds to an increase in the 
odds in favor of being a member of a group by around 1.5, compared to being a resident of 
Attiki. 
 
One might argue that the region with more favorable socioeconomic conditions will also 
portray higher levels of group membership. However, the statement is not supported by the 
data, as Central Greece has the lowest per capita GDP and the highest income inequality 
amongst all regions. Another explanation might be that the supply of social groups and 
organizations is greater in Central Greece, thus the greater the opportunity or incentive for 
individuals to join. But, according to available data and research on the voluntary sector in 
Greece (see VOLMED, 1997; Panagiotidou, 2000), the bulk of organizations tend to 
concentrate in Attiki, compared to which all other regions portray a larger impact on the 
probability of individual group membership. It is possible thus that regional differences in the 
stock of social capital may have their roots in Greece’s modern history. As Paraskevopoulos 
(2001) notes in his comparative study of Greek regions, the relatively higher stock of social 
capital observed in the Ionian Islands or the South Aegean Islands may be partly due to the 
fact that these regions had been for a longer period of time under Venetian or British rule, 
thus avoiding the authoritarian and arbitrary rule of the Ottoman Empire, which spread 
distrust and weakened Greek civil society, as we discussed in Section III. 
 
In Europe it is evident from our results in TABLE 4a that individuals residing in all European 
countries other than the Mediterranean region - Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal - are more 
likely to be members of groups. This is in line with arguments that social capital and civil 
society in countries of the South of Europe are underdeveloped. Particularly, according to 
TABLE 4b, where dummy variables represent individual European countries rather than 
larger regional conglomerates, individuals residing in any other EU country apart from 
Greece are more likely to be members of groups. The regression coefficients imply an 
increase in the odds by 4.95, compared to the Mediterranean South. Indeed, compared to 
Greece, Sweden has the largest coefficient, implying an increase in the odds of being a group 
member by 16.957, followed by Denmark with a coefficient implying an increase of 14.712. 
This is also in agreement with features of social regulation in Nordic countries, which is based 
on the operation of corporatist institutions (see Henley and Tsakalotos, 1993)). With regards 
to France, the weaker incentive for participation, reflected in the smaller coefficient, which 
places France in a ranking just above Italy and the remainder of the Mediterranean countries   16
(see TABLE 4b), coincides with observations that France, with its highly centralized 
government, has low levels of trust and social capital (see, for instance, Fukuyama, 1995). 
 
The interesting point to note from our findings here is that Germany, despite its social 
economy (Sozialmarktwirtschaft), which has widely been documented in the literature (see, 
Streeck, 1997), has one of the smallest coefficients. Indeed, in TABLE 4b of the individual 
country dummy variables, Germany ranks just above Portugal, the country with the smallest 
coefficient. The increase in the odds of being a member of a group as a result of living in 
Germany, compared to living in Greece, is 3.051 (whereas for Portugal the corresponding 
increase amounts to 2.556). This might be in accordance with studies on cross-country 
voluntarism and civic behavior in Europe, which also observe low levels of voluntary 
participation in Germany compared to other European countries (see Gaskin and Smith, 
1994). The explanation offered in these studies is that German civil society may have 
developed distaste towards voluntarism and participation on account of its compulsory nature 
in Nazi Germany during the World Wars. This does not mean that social capital is low in 
Germany; it might mean that norms and networks of cooperation that appear to be the basis of 
German Sozialmarktwirtschaft, obtained a more institutional or structural form, not captured 
by our group membership variable. 
 
Finally, the Agglosaxon countries - UK and Ireland - portray strong incentives for group 
membership. According to TABLE 4a, these countries have the highest coefficient following 
the Nordic countries. Being a resident of these countries corresponds to an increase in the 
odds of being a member of a group to 3.5, compared to the Mediterranean countries. 
Particularly, being a resident of the UK has a strong impact on the probability of being a 
member of a group: the increase in the odds is 10.0, compared to being a resident of Greece. 
In fact, the UK falls just a bit behind Denmark (where the increase in the odds is 14.712) and 
above Finland (where the odds increase by 9.561). This result is observed despite the 
country’s market liberalism. Apparently, social groups and organizations of the economy’s 
voluntary sector work to supplement state welfare services, which create an environment 
termed mixed economy welfare or welfare pluralism. However, there is evidence that lack of 
cooperation between firms in Britain renders entrepreneurial activity less effective, compared 
to Germany and Japan (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997). More importantly, government tactics 
to allocate the provision of social services to voluntary organizations might provoke 
competition, which might compel them to compromise their social aims and substitute them 
with commercial strategies in order to secure their own survival, as well as the needs of the 
target groups who cannot afford to obtain these services through the market or state welfare 
(Salamon, 1993). 
 
The next step was to investigate what socioeconomic characteristics of regions and countries 
affect the incentive of individuals to participate and become members of groups (TABLE 4c). 
Therefore, we replace regional- and country-specific dummies with aggregate socioeconomic 
indicators, namely per capita GDP, the total unemployment rate and an income distribution 
index (defined in TABLE 2 of the Appendix). For Greece, these indicators were calculated at 
the regional level for 4 regions, and for the case of the EU they were calculated for 14 
countries, amongst which the former 15 EU member-states, except Luxembourg. In the EU, 
we observe that per capita GDP, as an index of individual welfare, has a strong positive 
impact on the individual’s probability to become a member of a group. The coefficient 
implies that an increase in the odds of 4.3 - the highest amongst all coefficients - for a unit 
increase in the natural log of the share of per capita GDP. This result is not far from evidence 
provided in empirical work, such as that of Knack and Keefer (1997) who detect a positive 
impact of per capita GDP on trust and civic cooperation within a cross-country analysis. 
Another aggregate socioeconomic factor widely mentioned in the literature is that of income 
inequality. Costa and Kahn (2001) find evidence of the impact of income inequality, 
controlling for several other indices of social fragmentation, such as ethnicity. In our sample, 
we observe that for the EU an increase in income inequality has a strong negative effect on   17
individual group membership. It may be the case that as relative income changes to become 
less equal within the population, individuals may build a sense of isolation and distrust 
towards society, and thus abstain from group participation. This may also be the case for 
aggregate unemployment, although to a lesser degree, since the coefficient for unemployment 
is negative, but smaller, corresponding to a reduction in the odds of being a member of 5.6% 
for a unit increase in the unemployment rate. Thus, the impact of the unemployment rate on 
individual incentives for participation is rather limited compared to other explanatory 
variables. 
 
Although coefficients for the EU are statistically significant at the 1% level, for Greece only 
the unemployment rate is statistically significant at the 5% level. This may be due to the fact 
that comparing for only 4 regions in the same country may result in a relatively high 
correlation between variables, producing collinearity, which affects the statistical significance 
of coefficients. Thus, a more disaggregated regional distinction within Greece may be 
required to have wider variation in values of aggregate indices and detect their effects on 
individual group membership. At this point, we can only comment on the unemployment rate 
variable, which has a coefficient twice as high than in the EU and appears to have a negative 
impact on group membership. 
 
A final remark worth mentioning is that in Greece lower per capita GDP shares, coupled with 
a more unequal distribution within regions, increase the probability to be a member of a 
group. On the contrary, in Europe, a lower per capita GDP share and a more unequal 
distribution within countries reduce the probability to be a member of a group. Since the stock 
of social capital appears to be higher in other EU countries, one would have expected that 
individual participation and social forces would be more responsive to situations of lower 
GDP and higher inequality. But it might be the case that in Europe the very existence of 
institutionalized private and public bodies for social protection, upon which individuals can 
rely, partly substitutes for collective action in the form of group membership of individuals. It 
might be a sign of a more developed, institutional structural form of social capital, replacing 
individual or local initiatives, often isolated or fragmentary across regions and time, in 
confronting social problems. However, it might alternatively indicate that in Europe lower 
GDP and higher inequality create a disincentive for social participation, especially for 
individuals who face the consequences of belonging to the lower tale of the distribution of 
income. But further research needs to be done in order to determine individual group 







In this paper the discussion focused on the role of social capital in Greece compared to the 
European Union. We can recall from Section II that social capital refers to the stock of social 
relations, based on norms and networks of cooperation and trust, that spill over to the market 
and state to enhance collective action between formal actors and achieve improved social 
efficiency and growth. In this sense, social capital emphasizes the capacity of the social, 
institutional and cultural context to become a productive resource for the economy. We 
examined these hypotheses by focusing on features of social organization in Greece and their 
effect on economic reform and growth in Section III. The main conclusion was that a tradition 
of low civicness hampered reform and development as policy-makers failed to take under 
consideration the role and reaction of wider social groups and promoted projects in which the 
distribution of costs and benefits created uncertainty and thus social resistance. 
 
To shed further light on the impact of social capital on socioeconomic reform and 
development, we turn in Section IV to the main aim of this paper, which is the investigation   18
of the determinants of social capital in Greece, compared to the EU. For this purpose, we 
regress an index of social capital, related to the incentive of an individual to become a 
member of a group, on a set of individual, as well as aggregate variables. An important 
conclusion from our empirical analysis is that both individual- and aggregate-level factors 
determine the individual’s participatory behavior. However, the impact of these variables on 
group membership varies across countries. This is indicative of the fact that features of social 
regulation interact with the socioeconomic conditions and institutional influences that are 
specific to a country’s history and culture. It is crucial to gaining an understanding of social 
capital and its links to socioeconomic performance and growth in any particular region or 
country. Furthermore, if our assumption on the positive relationship between social capital 
and economic growth holds true, then the cross-country analysis of determinants of social 
capital might also shed light on the means to rebuilding norms and networks of trust and 
cooperation for social well-being. 
 
This brings us to one of the most difficult issues yet to be resolved in the literature: how can a 
region with low levels of trust and civicness rebuild its stock of social capital, and replace the 
activities of special-interest groups with generalized norms and networks of reciprocity, trust 
and cooperation? The practical importance of this issue is evident especially for Greece, 
where narrow-interested groups and patron-client relations appear to have permeated the 
public and private sector and inhibited social reform and economic growth. 
 
Based on regression results recorded in Section IV, we observe that in most countries of the 
EU factors like education and unemployment have a strong impact on the probability of an 
individual to be a member of a group. On the one hand, the education system, one of the 
prime agents of socialization, can grant individuals access to social networks and transmit 
values of reciprocity and cooperation. On the other, the individual facing unemployment has a 
strong disincentive to participate in social groups, partly on account of the distrust he/she 
tends to develop towards society. Thus, expanding education and employment opportunities 
would apparently increase the incentive to participate in groups and enhance the stock of 
social capital. Additionally, gender, marital status and age are variables of equal importance. 
Although marriage increases the likelihood of being a member of a group for men and 
women, the increase in the odds to being a member is for women half that of men, even after 
women have entered the labor market and are exposed to a series of social and professional 
organizations. This is probably because a rise in women’s group membership is at the expense 
of familial obligations within the household, traditionally held by women. But it is not only 
women who confront obstacles to participating in social groups on account of traditional 
perceptions of their social role. In Greece, the working age group appears to be more likely to 
participate in groups, as opposed to the rest of Europe where younger or elder non-working 
groups are most likely to be members. Therefore, for group membership to increase amongst 
women, youth and elders, norms and networks propagating the significance of their 
participation and service to society must be established. 
 
However, apart from individual factors, aggregate variables at the regional or country level 
seem to affect group membership. Although we must be cautious with interpreting results for 
Greece, given the rather small number of regions, we observed that lower per capita GDP and 
higher income inequality reduced the probability of group membership in EU, as opposed to 
Greece. One explanation was that in the EU lower GDP and higher inequality create a 
disincentive for social participation, especially from the part of individuals facing lower 
income and poverty, as a result of social exclusion. Alternatively, it may be the case that in 
the EU other forms of social protection may be available to cushion instances of worsened 
socioeconomic conditions, substituting widespread individual participation. These forms of 
social protection might include state welfare systems, but might also direct to a more 
developed, institutional or structural form of social capital, which replaces individual or local 
incentives of participatory behavior, often isolated and fragmentary across regions and time, 
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segments of the population in response to the social problems faced by these groups. But 
further research is required in order to establish the relationship of social capital with the 
welfare state, as well as with the third sphere - voluntary sector - of the economy. It would be 
interesting to explore how social capital, as norms and networks, supports the development of 
formal institutions of social protection and welfare, and how it supplements or substitutes 
them when institutional or structural provisions have not as yet been undertaken and 
promoted to such a degree as to confront the pressing social issues that emerge in an ever-
changing economic and social environment. 
 
At all events, it is evident from our results that there are institutional factors affecting social 
capital and that these factors have a different impact on group membership across countries. 
Indeed, in Greece the probability of group membership was higher in the Central region, 
compared to other regions in the country, whereas in the EU it was the Nordic countries that 
had a higher probability compared to the Mediterranean South. As we discussed in the paper, 
these findings are quite in line with case studies and historical references of indigenous civil 
societies and civic traditions. Nevertheless, observations with regards to Germany and the 
UK, for instance, required further analysis into the history and institutional structure of 
patterns of participatory behavior. Thus, in Germany, even if the probability of group 
membership is lower, it may be the case that other forms of social capital, not captured by our 
variable, in the organization of the market and networking relations between firms may be at 
the essence of its social economy and domestic social capital. Similarly, in the UK, the higher 
probability for group membership may be a response to the lack of cooperative networks and 
social regulation in the sphere of market and corporate relations, which tend to be based on a 
more liberal stance. Overall, this means that a comparative study across countries should not 
overlook the importance of systemic, country-specific factors in determining the incentive of 
an individual to be a member of a group. Quantitative approaches such as the regressions 
analyses implemented here should be accompanied by qualitative assessments of the nature 
and effect of variables on group membership and social capital in general. 
 
On the whole, individual and aggregate factors play a role in determining group membership 
and social capital. They imply that the reconstruction of social capital depends on the 
expansion of opportunities for social participation and cooperation to wider segments of the 
society and on changes in the tradition of countries of low trust and weak civil societies. But 
to expand opportunities for participation and cooperation might call for changes in the civic 
tradition of countries: practices of special-interest groups and clientelistic relations, supported 
through time by authoritarian regimes, should be replaced by generalized norms and 
networks. According to case studies that appear in the social capital literature (e.g. Heller, 
1996; Fox, 1996; Petro, 2001), changes in tradition were possible when social stakeholders in 
the reform process took part in mechanisms of political exchange and debate, and promoted 
state-society synergy. On the one hand, reformists in state administration contributed to social 
capital by securing the right to association and building confidence in public institutions, 
through impartial, transparent and credible mechanisms of administration. For instance, only 
recently has the Greek government passed a law for non-governmental organizations, which 
offered recognition, as well as financial support, and boosted the activities and cooperation of 
the voluntary sector. On the other hand, local grassroots associations can build social capital 
from below by representing collective interest and legitimizing market and state practices in 
terms of social aims and common values. This depends not only on the strengthening of bonds 
within groups, but also on the bridging of bonds across groups, to create generalized norms 
and networks and promote the activities of more encompassing groups (Woolcock, 1998). For 
Greece, the weakness of civic society is not located in the lack of mutual bonds within groups 
as much as in the absence of bridging across local and regional groups.    20
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TABLE 1: GROUP MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 














DENMARK  3983 65.1  25026 
UNITED KINGDOM  8662 56.0  21598 
FINLAND  7107 55.2  21442 
AUSTRIA  6235 47.7  23484 
IRELAND  5441 46.2  24133 
NETHERLANDS  8916 44.8  23838 
SWEDEN  5732 40.9  21620 
BELGIUM  4989 37.3  23446 
GERMANY  11204 28.9 22712 
FRANCE  10680 27.4 20861 
SPAIN  13020 24.5 17319 
ITALY  15151 23.8 21158 
PORTUGAL  11183 18.0 16065 
GREECE  9324 8.9  14198 
TOTAL ECHP sample  121627  32.4  21131 
  r = 0,784 
(p = 0,001) 
 
 
α Source : European Community Household Panel, Wave 6, 1999 (European Commission). 
 
β Source  : Eurostat (2001), Eurostat Yearbook: The Statistical Guide to Europe, Data 1989-
1999, General Statistics, Theme 1 (European Commission). Data from year 1999.  
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION AND DATA SOURCE OF VARIABLES 
SET OF VARIABLES  DESCRIPTION AND DATA SOURCE 
Individual- level variables 
Group membership  
 
Dichotomous variable with values yi = 1, if the individual is a member of a group, and yi = 
0, if he/she is not member of group. Corresponds to ECHP data, Wave 6, 1999. 
 
Natural log of personal net income  Interval variable of personal income of individuals, net of taxes. To assure comparability 
across European countries values in national currency were transformed in terms of 
purchasing power standards (PPS). In regressions, income was entered as natural log. Data 
from ECHP data, Wave 6, 1999. 
 
Highest level of education completed 
 
Set of dummy variables for completing less than secondary level - used as the baseline, for 
secondary level, and tertiary level education. Data derived from ECHP data, Wave 6, 1999, 
where it appears as an ordinal variable. 
 
Working status   
 
Set of dummy variables for being employed, for being unemployed, and being inactive, 





Set of dummy variables for following age groups: 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 66-75, 
76-85. The latter age group was chosen as the baseline. Appears as an interval variable in the 




Dichotomous variable with values yi = 1 for male, and yi = 0 for female. Data from ECHP 




Dichotomous variable with values yi = 1, if married, and yi = 0, if otherwise. Appears as 
ordinal variable in original from ECHP data, Wave 6, 1999. 
 
Aggregate -level variables 
Greek Regions 
 
Set of dummy variables for 4 regions, according to NUTS I level of regional classification: 
North (GR1), Central Greece (GR2), South (GR4), and Attiki (GR3). Data in ECHP data, 
Wave 6, 1999. North includes Thraki, Macedonia, and Thessaly; Central is Ipiros, 
Peloponese, Ionian Islands, Sterea Ellada, excluding Attiki; South is Crete and Aegean 




Set of dummy variables for member-states of former EU-15, with the sole exception of 
Luxembourg: Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland); Agglosaxon countries (UK, 
Ireland); Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands); France; Austria; Germany; Mediterranean 
countries (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal). Data in ECHP data, Wave 6, 1999. 
 
Natural log of  per capita GDP    Gross domestic product at market prices. Current series in purchasing power standards (PPS) 
per head. Expressed as share of EU-15. In regressions, entered as natural log. For cross-
European regressions, data from Eurostat (2001), Eurostat Yearbook: The Statistical Guide 
to Europe, Data 1989-1999, General Statistics, Theme 1, European Commission. For cross-
regional regressions within Greece, data from Eurostat (2001), Regions statistical yearbook, 
2001, European Commission. 
 
Unemployment Rate  Total unemployment rate of men and women. Data for 1999. For cross-European 
regressions, data from Eurostat (2001), Eurostat Yearbook: The Statistical Guide to Europe, 
Data 1989-1999, General Statistics, Theme 1, European Commission. For cross-regional 
regressions within Greece, data from Eurostat (2001), Regions statistical yearbook, 2001, 
European Commission. 
 
Income distribution    The ratio of the total income received by the 20% of the country’s population with the 
highest income - top quintile, to that received by the 20% of the countries lowest income -
lowest quintile; income should be understood in terms of equivalized household income. Data 
for 1999 from Eurostat (2002), General Statistics: Structural Indicators, European 
Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat . 
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
 
SET OF VARIABLES 
GREECE EU-15 
 Mean    Std. 
Deviation 
N Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
N 
Group membership  
(yi = 1, if member of group) 














Natural log of personal net income  8.6816  1.0629 7174 9.0310  1.1439  110210 
Highest level of education completed 
Set of dummy variables for: 
      
Less than secondary level  baseline  baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline 
Secondary  level  0.2978  0.4573 9570 0.2931  0.4552  130240 
Tertiary  level  0.1189  0.3237 9570 0.1851  0.3884  130240 
Working status   
Set of dummy variables for: 
      
Employed  0.4312  0.4953 9574 0.5224  0.4995  130803 
Unemployed  0.0510  0.2200 9574 0.0526  0.2231  130803 
Inactive  - - - - - - 
Age 
Set of dummy variables for: 
      
16-25  0.1614  0.3679 9413 0.1576  0.3643  129819 
26-35  0.1664  0.3724 9413 0.1925  0.3942  129819 
36-45  0.1646  0.3708 9413 0.1868  0.3898  129819 
46-55  0.1558  0.3627 9413 0.1675  0.37343  129819 
56-65  0.1143  0.3514 9413 0.1330  0.3396  129819 
66-75  0.1461  0.3532 9413 0.1097  0.3125  129819 
76-85  - - - - - - 
Gender 
(yi = 1, if male) 














(yi = 1, if married) 















Set of dummy variables for:  
      
North 0.3581  0.47946  9423       
Central 0.2738  0.44493  9423       
South 0.1317  0.3382  9423       
Attiki -  -  -       
European Countries 
Set of dummy variables for: 
      
Nordic countries        0.1553  0.3622  131386 
Agglosaxon countries        0.1080  0.3104  131386 
Benelux        0.1465  0.3536  131386 
France       0.0813  0.2733  131386 
Austria       0.0475  0.2128  131386 
Germany       0.0859  0.2802  131386 
Mediterranean countries       - - - 
Region of birthplace and residence   0.7504  0.4328 9222 0.7596  0.4273  93290 
Natural log of  per capita GDP    4.1242  0.1496 9423 4.5944  0.2018  131386 
Unemployment Rate  11.4477  1.5163 9423 8.4979  3.8289  131386 
Income distribution   5.9533  0.5461 9423 4.6117  1.0524  131386   26
TABLE 4a: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR GREECE AND THE EU 
Dependent variable yi: Group membership  GREECE EU-15 
 
Independent variables xi 
β = 
 
∂[ln Pi /1-Pi] / ∂xi 
e 
β
  =  


























Education:   less than secondary level  -  -  -  - 
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Attiki -  -     
Region: Nordic countries  
(Denmark) 




Agglosaxon countries  
(UK, Ireland) 























(Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal) 




N  6796 103884 
Pseudo R^2 (Cox-Snell index)  0.066 0.143 
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Greece -   
N 103884 
Pseudo R^2 (Cox-Snell index)  0.143   28
TABLE 4c: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR GREECE AND THE EU 
 
Dependent variable yi: Group membership, binary  GREECE EU-15 
 
Independent variables xi 
β = 
 
∂[ln Pi /1-Pi] / ∂xi 
e 
β
  =  








[Pi /1-Pi]1 / 
[Pi /1-Pi]0 
















Education:   less than secondary level  - - - - 
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N  6796 103884 







Statistical significance at 1% level  ***, 5 % level **, 10% level *. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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